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Time as Space in the Structure of (Literary) Experience: The Prelude

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Abstract and Keywords

As an essentially temporal yet highly patterned event, literary experience mirrors cognitive experience more generally. In both, past experience pervasively informs present experience and present experience, in turn, predicts and conditions future experience. In literature, however, this conversion of actual sequence into perceived superposition, of time into space, tends to be more palpable and accordingly more legible. Using the example of William Wordsworth's spatial poetics as enacted in *The Prelude* and as analyzed by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Geoffrey Hartman, and Isobel Armstrong, this chapter argues that literary experience may provide unique insight and access into the temporal structure of cognition. This foundational dimension of cognitive experience is mischaracterized by our habitual conceptualizations of time, and as a consequence it has been largely overlooked in cognitive analyses of these conceptualizations, such as those proposed by blending theory. Attention to the temporal dynamics of literary comprehension may help to remedy this oversight.

Keywords: time, space, spatial poetics, blending theory, Wordsworth, Coleridge, The Prelude

The Past as Prologue

EACH moment of cognition is, in a psychological if not a Platonic sense, a *re-cognition*. Though we're seldom aware of it, present experience is pervasively mediated by past experience, as we literally *feel* in those surprisingly rare moments of *mis-re-cognition*, when a shadow seems a someone, or a mere noise a meaningful name. Such mistakes reveal that even simple perception—of a three-dimensional object, say, or of a word token

—is never a matter only of a moment but always of at least *two* moments or times: the present instant, in which light or sound waves strike the eye or ear, and the instance of the past, that is, consolidated foregoing experience that interprets these sensory impulses according to preestablished and therefore *anticipated* ideas. These anticipatory ideas or “psychological sets” include not just semantic concepts and linguistic signs but also embodied feelings, for example, the muscular and vestibular “memories” that unconsciously “know” where and when the landing of a familiar staircase falls and are alarmingly destabilized if, by a miscalculation of a single step, it doesn’t. Most of the time, however, the foot lands as expected and the shadows lay where they ought, so the predictive aspect of ongoing experience rarely comes—or rather jolts—to consciousness.

That the mind thinks before and beyond immediate sensation is perhaps most clearly seen in language use, which involves the processing of aural or visual stimulation, instantly and transparently, according to categorical presets. That irritating character we all know, the completer-of-other-people’s-sentences, simply gives voice to the (p. 594) grammatical and lexical predictions that any competent auditor would silently be making. The linguist’s Cloze test likewise illustrates our normally unconscious anticipation of where strings of words are heading. Take, for example, “a bird in the ____.” Reading the first four words of the phrase leads one to predict what the fifth will be, and unsurprisingly most people readily fill the blank with “hand,” “oven,” “tree,” “air,” or another high-frequency collocate. These linguistic prepossessions are confirmed by subjects’ rapid processing of phrases with expected collocates but significantly slower and more uncertain processing of phrases with unexpected or “deviant” collocates. Deviant answers are measurably more or less so, but still always on account of preconditioned expectations: for example, “a bird in the *bird*” is semantically deviant but not grammatically, since the prepositional phrase beginning “in the” leads us to predict that the open syntactic slot will be filled by a noun, whereas “a bird in the *of*” is deviant both semantically and grammatically.¹

Linguists speak of this duality at the heart of language in terms of a dynamic interface between “bottom-up” and “top-down” processes of cognition. “Bottom-up” processes are the “peripheral” operations of sense that transmit sound waves from a voice or light waves from the surface of a printed page; “top-down” processes are the “central” operations of the brain that recognize the transmitted waves as language forms and predictively decode their sequence and substance. This hierarchical metaphor has been extended in cognitive science to characterize our perceptual and cognitive operations in general. Thus, the *Dictionary of Cognitive Science* from University of Alberta defines “top-down processing” in terms of a feedback loop between interrelated cognitive systems, with the “most basic” sensory-motor systems feeding data “upward” to the “most complex” systems, such as “memory” and “problem-solving,” which superimpose in

a “downward” direction “information about past experiences” that is “stored in the higher levels of the system.”

Instead of using a “top-down” metaphor for such past-to-present processing, however, linguists and cognitive scientists might better speak of “back-to-front” processing.² Both metaphors are spatial, but only the second captures the temporal signature of cognition, our compelling sense that time flows along a horizontal line and not up or down a vertical one. Based on our embodied, “forward-looking” or prospective orientation in space, the “back-to-front” metaphor likewise improves upon conventional conceptualizations of time as something that “goes by” or that we “get through.” Where these conventional metaphors represent future time as standing before or coming toward us and past time as disappearing behind us, the “back-to-front” metaphor captures a salient fact about the direction of time in the *actual process*, as opposed to the *conceptual products*, of cognition. In cognition as distinguished from conceptualization, time flows *forward*, with past informing present, and past-informed present prefiguring the future.

One of the earliest and still one of the most compelling expositors of the forward-going nature of temporal experience is the poet William Wordsworth. From *Tintern Abbey*’s reviving “picture of the mind” to the *Immortality Ode*’s “master-light of all our seeing” to *The Prelude*’s “spots of time, / Which with distinct preeminence retain / A renovating virtue,” Wordsworth’s best and most enduring poetry not only thematizes (p. 595) the presentness of the past but literally *re-presents* it. Indeed, for Wordsworth, the *re-presenting* of the past constitutes the essential activity of the poet and, accordingly, of his reader. Poetry may originate in “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” but those powerful “influxes of feeling” must be, as Wordsworth immediately insists, “recollected in tranquillity,” which is to say, “modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings.”³ As he put it in a verse fragment penned two years earlier,

The original impression of delight
... by such retrospect [is] recalled
To yet a second and a second life,
While in this excitation of the mind
A vivid pulse of sentiment and thought
Beat[s] palpably with in us, and all shades
Of consciousness [are] ours.⁴

Retrospection is not a “looking back” upon the past but rather a *reversion* of that past, in which the memorial return *to* a former state, belief, or interest “reverses direction” and becomes, in present conscious experience, a return *of* that former state, belief, or interest, or at least a version of it.⁵ Wordsworthian retrospection is thus a form of

resurrection or reanimation, bringing an “original impression” to “a second and a second life” and thereby “exciting” the mind to a “vivid,” “palpable” apprehension of its own temporal complexity, figured as multiple “shades of consciousness.” Anatomizing this retrospective process in the Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth underscores its reversionary effect of *re-presenting* the past. Poetry “takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility: the emotion is contemplated till. . . the tranquillity gradually disappears, and an emotion, similar to that which was before the subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the mind.”⁶

Because the poet is endowed with “a disposition to be affected more than other men by absent things as if they were present,” he is able to “conjur[e] up in himself passions, which are indeed far from being the same as those produced by real events, yet. . . do more nearly resemble the passions produced by real events, than any which, from the motions of their own minds merely, other men are accustomed to feel in themselves.”⁷

Wordsworth here identifies two significant obstacles to the scientific study of the mind and at the same time intimates the logic of an approach by which they may be overcome. Notoriously, recollection is not recovery but recreation: actual experience, even of a moment ago, is inescapably altered when it is reframed and reproduced for introspective or retrospective reflection.⁸ Accordingly, when it “revives” in the present, the recollected emotion is only “similar to” the emotion originally experienced, not least because the original was immediately “produced by real events,” while the re-version is “gradually” or mediately produced by the mental “events” of recollection and contemplation. This necessary difference between immediate perception and memorial reflection means that the individual cannot consciously access a “pure” or temporally single moment of cognition. But of course, given the pervasive reality of top-down or (p. 596) back-front processing even in the simplest acts of object or language recognition, there is no such thing as a temporally “pure” moment of cognition. And here the second obstacle crops up. While all cognition is temporally complex, involving the prospective recreation of past or “absent things as if they were present,” most humans are “unaccustomed” and “indisposed” to “feel” this “*in themselves*.” Indeed, the brain-mind being adapted for habituation, even routines acquired with effortful conscious supervision (e.g., brushing teeth, driving a car) become automated to the point where they are rendered “cognitively impenetrable.” For most people most of the time, the preconstruction of present experience in terms of past learning is simply not perceived, nor can it be brought to awareness by “the motions of their own minds merely.” If individuals, generally speaking, have direct access neither to “pure” nor to “complex” temporality in their own everyday cognition, how is the temporal structure of cognition to be investigated?

Wordsworth’s answer is *through poetic or artificial cognitive experience*, which operates by analogy to the ordinary or natural kind and yet produces states of awareness that are

difficult to achieve in everyday cognition. The poet's recreative activity produces artificial passions that yet "more nearly resemble the passions produced by real events" than does any emotional experience remembered or conjured by most other individuals. While they cannot move themselves into such passionate states through their own conscious efforts, Wordsworth suggests that the poet may so move them through *his*. In the circular economy of poetic feeling, the poet converts a real emotional memory into an analogous emotional experience and then converts that analogous emotional experience into a verbal re-presentation; when read, the reader converts this representation into an emotional experience that is analogous to the poet's and therefore likewise analogous to the reader's own real emotional experience, with the key difference that the poetically induced one is *legible* in its temporal complexity. Thus, while we may be hard-put to access directly the cognitive structure of everyday experience, we can access an articulated model ("imitation," "mimesis") of that structure in literary experience. Since all cognition is phenomenologically factual, such literary experiences have as much and arguably more to tell us about the structure of our minds than does the time-worn cognition of everyday, shrouded in the veil of familiarity.⁹

The Supplement of the Past: Spatial Form in Theory

Wordsworth's *Prelude* is well known for its powerful representations of spatialized "spots of time," remembered experiences from early life that, despite the "wide. . . vacancy between me and those days, / . . . yet have such self-presence in my mind / That sometimes when I think on them I seem / Two consciousnesses—conscious of myself, / And of some other being."¹⁰ These lines figure intervals of time as intervals of space ("wide," "vacancy," "between"), preserving the distance of "those days" while simultaneously (p. 597) converting them to spatial "presences" in these. The first and still the most perceptive analyst of this spatial poetics is Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who noted, just days after hearing these lines read aloud, that "Mental Space [is] constituent of Genius," especially Wordsworth's.¹¹ The editor of Coleridge's *Notebooks* glosses this observation with a notion Coleridge had spelled out a few months earlier, concerning that "state of mind" in which there "is a transmutation of the *succession of Time* into the *juxtaposition of Space*."¹² This is a precise characterization of the Wordsworthian spot of time, which likewise seeks to transform chronological disjunction into topological conjunction or, in Coleridge's phrase, "co-existent Multitude."¹³

Coleridge here defines in so many words what has since come to be called (without reference to Coleridge) “spatial form in modern literature.”¹⁴ According to Joseph Frank’s influential but admittedly “idealized” argument,¹⁵ spatial form attempts to counteract the constitutive temporality of language, where word follows word in grammatical sequence and meaning-making is necessarily a function of time. For Frank, spatial form thus involves deformation of the sequential relations of grammar, chronology, causality, and the like, in favor of “simultaneous” or pattern-based relations of repetition, association, likeness, contrast, and so on, that are perceived “in a moment of time.”¹⁶ Poems like Eliot’s *Waste Land* and Pound’s *Cantos* most closely approach “pure” spatial form, in which “syntactical sequence is given up,” “frustrating the reader’s normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive the elements of the poem *juxtaposed in space* rather than unrolling in time.”¹⁷ Such poetry, Frank claimed, “demands a complete reorientation in the reader’s attitude towards language” and “asks its readers to suspend the process of individual reference temporarily until the entire pattern of internal references can be apprehended as a unity.”¹⁸ This is clearly overstated; more plausibly, Frank suggests that “the struggle towards spatial form in Pound and Eliot resulted in the disappearance of coherent sequence after a few lines; but the novel, with its larger unit of meaning, can preserve coherent sequence within the unit of meaning and break up only the time-flow of the narrative.”¹⁹ Yet this still overreaches by drawing too thick a line between poetry and novel, lyric and narrative, space and time. Compounding problems, Frank persistently implies that spatial form is the product and exponent of modernism, even though he derives his terminology from Gotthold Lessing’s eighteenth-century essay on spatial and temporal forms in the verbal and visual arts, *Laokoön* (1766). Lessing wrote in opposition to the spatial poetics that was newly flourishing in eighteenth-century descriptive poetry and that derived from the ancient *ut pictura poesis* tradition in aesthetics, holding that a poem may be conceived of as “a speaking picture” (and a painting, in turn, as “a dumb poem”). Lessing urged the inescapable temporality of the linguistic medium as a strong argument against the spatializing objectives of verbal *description* as opposed to *narration*, for description sets itself the counterintuitive and technically impossible task of representing immobile objects or static figures. According to Lessing, these essentially spatial objectives can be more easily and effectively realized in the atemporal media of drawing, painting, and sculpture.

Writing 50 years after Lessing but nearly 150 before Frank, Coleridge has already complicated their neat distinctions by insisting upon the spatialization of time as a general (p. 598) (if regularly concealed) feature of human cognitive experience and so likewise of literary structure and cognition. Literary structure works not to replace sequence with simultaneity, but rather to superimpose or fuse those opposite sensations, preserving the sense of temporal “distance” in the midst of spatial “connection.”²⁰ Spatial

form in literature does not replace temporal, sequential, or narrative form but depends on it (and vice versa); spatial form is therefore neither exclusive to lyric genres nor peculiar to modernism, as Wordsworth's *Prelude* amply demonstrates.

With its greater scope and inclusiveness, Coleridge's analysis looks beyond Frank's theory of spatial form to Roman Jakobson's all-embracing theory of a "poetic function" in language, according to which "literariness" may be gauged by the extent to which patterned or parallel structures predominate in the verbal sequence.²¹ As Frank himself later acknowledged,²² Jakobson's more comprehensive analysis proposes that *all* utterances, literary and nonliterary, lyric, narrative, or otherwise, necessarily involve both spatial (paradigmatic, metaphoric) and temporal (syntagmatic, metonymic) relations, and that "literariness" and "periodicity" are therefore matters of degree rather than of absolutely distinguishable kinds. Likewise, lyric and narrative are not rigid generic categories but scalar possibilities within all literature. What Coleridge found distinctive in Wordsworth was his coordination of tendencies that had been understood and represented (for example by Lessing) as mutually exclusive. In the words of a contemporary critic (formulated with reference to Frank and Jakobson but not to Coleridge), Wordsworth "lyricizes narrative and gives lyric a narrative form," thereby inaugurating the "dominant modern convention" in verbal art.²³

Monique Morgan has recently developed this point, emphasizing the psychologically as well as historically prospective quality of *The Prelude*. Adapting Paul Ricoeur's distinction of "episodic" (temporal, chronological) and "configurational" (spatial, topological) dimensions in narrative discourse, Morgan argues that, by biasing the story of his life through a variety of structural means toward the configurational dimension, "Wordsworth constantly directs his readers to process the text prospectively. . . . Prospective reading allows the series of short lyrics to function together as one long lyric, restructures the presentation of time, and creates a more equal distribution of knowledge between the author and his audience."²⁴ Morgan captures a good deal about Wordsworth's spatial poetics—its psychological effect of reducing a series to an impression of unity, its representation of time as prospective rather than retrospective, its circulation of recreative effort and awareness from poet to reader—and she implies a crucial further point. As episodes accumulate along the sequence according to the reversionary logic of spatial configuration, significance also gathers, not by increments or mere addition, but by being continuously refreshed in working memory and (re)integrated in the reader's developing model of the discourse situation.

Like others before her, however, Morgan was anticipated and surpassed by Coleridge, who recognized that the augmented significance is not, in the first place, *conceptual* but instead *affective*, a matter of feeling before it becomes (recollected in tranquility) a

matter of thought. Through the “transmutation of the *succession of Time* into the *juxtaposition of Space*,” Coleridge writes, “the smallest Impulses, if quickly & regularly (p. 599) recurrent[,] *aggregate* themselves—& attain a kind of visual magnitude with a correspondent Intensity of general Feeling.”²⁵ To illustrate, Coleridge offers the striking image of “the *circle of Fire* made by whirling round a live Coal,”²⁶ which involves the “aggregation” of discrete visual sensations into a coherent spatial “magnitude” whose unified appearance is more intensely affecting than that of any of its temporally distinguishable parts. Coleridge faults the illustration, however, because the mind remains “passive” in the face of the illusion and cannot bring itself to experiential awareness of its own prospective contributions to the wondrous effect. In truth, with each succeeding moment of visual stimulation, the mind refreshes and integrates the last impression (which had refreshed the one before that, and so on) and looks forward to the next impression, which refreshes and integrates the compound image of the moment before and again looks forward to comprehend the next instant in terms of the persisting past. This automatic activity of mind generates the phenomenal appearance of a spatial whole composed of temporally disjunct parts, whose aggregation into unity is literally *felt* as augmented wonder.

To cultivate awareness of this active and pleurably affecting quality of mind, Coleridge turned to works of poetic genius that deploy spatial form (or Jakobson’s poetic function) to produce, artificially but nonetheless revealingly, the psychological “effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant.”²⁷ Coleridge supplies a deft illustration in Shakespeare’s simile describing Venus’s lingering view of the departing Adonis: “Look how a bright star shooteth from the sky! / So glides he through the night from Venus’ eye.” Like the phenomenal image of a wheel of fire in its conversion of sequence to simultaneity, the simile nevertheless differs insofar as it juxtaposes *two* images of temporal duration, one long and therefore replete with the idea of succession (Adonis’s departure, as watched by Venus), the other ever-so-brief and therefore replete with the idea of instantaneousness (the shooting star). The two measures are incommensurate, yet the distich, with its metaphoric logic reinforced by internal and end rhymes,²⁸ yields the distinct “sensation” of their spontaneous “connection” and interpenetration, despite and without destroying their essential difference.²⁹ Visualizing the simile, we seem to *perceive*, almost miraculously, the “co-modification” of succession to simultaneity, time to space.³⁰ Habituation blinds us to this miracle of everyday experience, but in poetry’s spatial form, it stands, or at least *feels*, revealed.

Critical Evidence: Spatial Form in Effect

In a note to the lyrical ballad “The Thorn,” Wordsworth defends what is certainly the structural backbone and signature aspect of his own spatial poetics: sheer repetition. Repetition involves and occasions re-cognition; it is the simplest or at least most obvious variety of spatial form. Though as readers we may be prone to say that a present instance (p. 600) of a repeated term “looks back” to a past instance or instances, as *experiencers* or *processors* of the text we should rather insist with Wordsworth that the present instance “recalls” that or those of the past. In terms of its cognitive effect, verbal repetition *refreshes* semantic traces that were previously activated in working memory but that are no longer focalized and are therefore in process of “decaying,” until by repetition they are “recalled / To yet a second and a second life.” Verbal doubling produces a cognitive redoubling with an accompanying “intensification,” to use Coleridge’s terms, in “general Feeling.” In his note, Wordsworth puts this point as he does in the foregoing Preface, in terms of our ordinary difficulty in understanding or communicating passion as it is produced by real events. In the actual moment of feeling, “every man” is “conscious of the inadequateness of our own power, or the deficiencies of language.”³¹ Naturally weak in understanding and articulating feeling, the average individual sustains his passion as he struggles to communicate it by repeating “the same words, or words of the same character.”³² Still, though it is a sign of conceptual and linguistic weakness in real life, such repetition becomes a sign of impassioned verbal power when reproduced in poetry. Here, “apparent tautology” becomes “the highest kind of beauty,” not merely symbolizing passion (as actual tautology does in real life) but “active[ly] and efficient[ly]” producing it in the reader.³³

So Wordsworth claims; the proof is in the readings. One of the most sensitive on record is *Wordsworth’s Poetry, 1787–1814*, in which Geoffrey Hartman recapitulates Wordsworth’s psychological point:

In a note on “The Thorn” appended to the 1800 edition of *Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth justifies certain tautologies in principle. His note bears out at least one point concerning his style. . . : its redundancies, some times beautifully appropriate, have a direct psychical function, being at once “symbols” of a passion, i.e. expressing the clinging or craving mind of the speaker, and “things,” i.e. expressions that do release the mind and allow the passion to broaden into words, or the words, by psychical transference, to take on a life of their own.³⁴

Hartman identifies a rich variety of stylistic redundancies in Wordsworth’s verse (e.g., anaphora, chiasmus, hendiadys, etc.) and precisely characterizes (his experience of) their

cognitive effects. Though he does not refer to “spatial form” per se, his phrasing indicates that he is responding to it, in just the ways predicted by Wordsworth. For example, he characterizes Wordsworth’s verbal (re)doublings as “gradual expansions that blend thought with thought, link feeling with feeling,” so that “we now feel the presence of two loci. . . that produce in blending a deeper and milder thing than each in isolation.”³⁵ Attesting to the reactivation or refreshment of items in his own working memory, Hartman speaks of “the renewal of the image” and “the renewal of the past in the present,” “despite time.”³⁶ He analogizes from visual experience to epitomize his reading experience in terms of “after-images” and, anticipating my title as well as my argument, concludes that Wordsworth “depicts the after-image as a formal part of the structure of experience.”³⁷

Isobel Armstrong gives an equally nuanced account of how Wordsworth uses lexical and grammatical form to induce a “palimpsestically layered” experience equivalent to (p. 601) his own, in which “earlier expectation” and its associated feelings infuse a “second qualitative experience,” persisting “under the new experience which is superimposed [spatially] and which supersedes it [temporally].”³⁸ To anchor Armstrong’s commentary, I provide here an extract from the first of the two spots of time Wordsworth names as such, in which he recounts that, as a mere child of only four or five years, he lost his way and guide while horseback riding, stumbled to a valley “bottom” where a murderer’s gibbet-post still stood, and then,

reascending the bare common, saw
A naked pool that lay beneath the hills,
The beacon on the summit, and more near,
A girl who bore a pitcher on her head
And seemed with difficult steps to force her way
Against the blowing wind. It was, in truth,
An ordinary sight, but I should need
Colours and words that are unknown to man
To paint the visionary dreariness
Which, while I looked all round for my lost guide,
Did at that time invest the naked pool,
The beacon on the lonely eminence,
The woman, and her garments vexed and tossed
By the strong wind. When, in blessed season,
With those two dear ones—to my heart so dear—
When, in the blessed time of early love,
Long afterwards I roamed about
In daily presence of this very scene,
Upon the naked pool and dreary crags,
And on the melancholy beacon, fell

The spirit of pleasure and youth's golden gleam—
And think ye not with radiance more divine
From these remembrances, and from the power
They left behind? So feeling comes in aid
Of feeling, and diversity of strength
Attends us, if but once we have been strong.³⁹

In his first presentation of the scene, Wordsworth focalizes objective details: “bare common,” “naked pool,” “the beacon on the summit,” “a girl who. . . seemed with difficult steps to force her way / Against the blowing wind.” As Armstrong observes, the initial “construction is nakedly literal and marks bare circumstantial and *spatial* relationships, making great use of the force of prepositions and adverbs.”⁴⁰ Having staked out a spatial topography and populated it with a “co-existent multitude” of objects, Wordsworth pauses to reflect on this memorial sketch and his need of “Colours and words unknown to man / To paint the visionary dreariness” of the remembered scene. The painterly metaphor discloses Wordsworth’s spatializing intention, but meanwhile our attention has been for several critical moments distracted from the topographical image of the foregoing lines, which must to some extent have begun to decay from working memory. With (p. 602) exquisite timing, Wordsworth then “revives” our now past impressions of the scene by repeating the words that first evoked them, only now endued with new emotional coloring. Here’s Armstrong: “Appropriate to the word ‘visionary,’ the second account of the scene constructs itself out of the first. It fuses and transfigures its elements. . . moving out of space and time but still dependent on ‘that time’ and on the naked pool, the beacon, the woman, which now share the solitary power and symbolic feeling of the ‘lonely eminence’ on which the beacon stands.”⁴¹

As for the writer “at that time” of real passionate experience, so for the reader at this time of felt poetic experience: the immediate images are “invested” with “colours” not formerly their own. “The summit” becomes, through transferred epithet, “a lonely eminence,” and the dynamic image of the girl struggling against the wind is likewise elaborated and enriched. Within a structure of repetition involving “the same words, or words of the same [denotative] character,” we find semantic augmentation (girl woman); the fleshing of abstract terms into concrete images (“seemed. . . to force” “vexed and tossed”), metonymic expansion (the singular “girl” parsed into “The woman, and her garments”), amplifying parallelism (“vexed and tossed”), sound-symbolic resonance (“garments vexed and tossed”; cf. “invest”), and rhythmic redoubling (the spondaic substitution on “strong wind” where before we had contractual iambs in “the blowing wind”). Collectively, these augmentations create a more powerful image than originally presented, yet the original is not thereby erased but rather reduplicated in another key. Playing the scene a second time creates the effect that Hartman calls the

“after-image,” halting the temporal unfolding of the narrative sequence for a moment of spatial concatenation and redoubled lyric concentration.

The repeated conjunction “when” restores the narrative flow of time, yet the discourse situation remains the same, but then some. With a third iteration of the passionately invested symbols of “naked pool,” “beacon,” and now doubled female form (“those two dear ones”),

The concrete forms become [further] abstracted into or fused with forms of emotion—“dreary crags,” “melancholy beacon.” They are derived out of the words and feelings which went before and yet they are new forms, new feelings, ready to be aided by and come in aid of further feeling, “the spirit of pleasure and youth’s golden gleam.” In all the descriptions. . . only the “naked pool” remains as a resistant, unchanged element as the passages evoke experience out of experience, compounding and recompounding it.⁴²

Though he would need “Colours and words that are unknown to man / To paint” the *actual* “visionary dreariness” he experienced as a child or the *actual* “spirit of pleasure” he experienced as a young man, testimony like Armstrong’s and Hartman’s confirms that Wordsworth’s use of spatial form can induce analogous experiences in the reader. Repeated and carefully modulated patterns of words and images (not to mention sounds, rhythms, syntactical structures, etc.) effectively spatialize time, producing forward-going networks of self-amplifying relations.⁴³

(p. 603) Spatial Poetics and Blending Theory

Stylistic investigation of the linguistic strategies by which Wordsworth’s spots of time accomplish the prospective transmutation of time into space, chronology into topology, may be of particular value to the “mental spaces” or “blending” theory of cognitive processing recently proposed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner.⁴⁴ As powerful as the blending model is—and it has been especially productive in literary studies⁴⁵—researchers are only now beginning to conceive ways of putting its hypothetical underpinnings to empirical test.⁴⁶ Carefully analyzed, Wordsworth’s spatial poetics could provide blending theorists with templates of linguistic conditions that prime “mental space” construction and blending. As indicated in the preceding sections, the record of literary-critical responses to Wordsworth’s poetry, beginning with Coleridge’s, stands as a matchless resource for this analytical project, and it comes complete with detailed accounts of correlated cognitive effects. These well-documented correlations may be more or less readily translated into specific experimental predictions (schematically: in

processing linguistic stimuli structured in x way, subjects will report/display y experience/ reaction).

Though credited in cognitive circles to Fauconnier's ground-breaking *Espaces mentaux*,⁴⁷ the theory of mental spaces was, as we've seen, originally proposed and uniquely articulated by Coleridge. As Coleridge and many subsequent critics have attested, Wordsworth is especially gifted in stimulating the cognitive activity that Fauconnier and Turner have dubbed "conceptual blending," whereby different "input spaces" of information (percepts, images, ideas, specific and schematic memories, etc.) are imaginatively "blended" to create a new, more or less unified conceptualization with "emergent" properties that can be found only in the blended space, not in the original input spaces. Wordsworth formulated a strikingly similar conception of imaginative processing, right down to the name he gives it: "The imagination," he claimed, "is that chemical faculty by which elements of the most different nature and distant origin are *blended* together into one harmonious and homogenous whole."⁴⁸ Like Coleridge in his famous definition of primary imagination in *Biographia*, Wordsworth understands imaginative blending to be the origin and essence of human consciousness. "Blending" is thus the first note of the first draft of *The Prelude*, representing the first creative act of the infant mind: "Was it for this / That one, the fairest of all rivers, loved / To blend his murmurs with my nurse's song. . ." ⁴⁹ Here, two different and distant streams of sound, one natural, the other lyrical, blend not in the objective space of physical reality but in the mental space of (imagined) infant perception. To represent this perceptual blending⁵⁰ by analogy, Wordsworth uses spatial form, the subtle but effective internal rhyme of "murmurs" and "nurse's," in which the already redoubled sound-image of the first term looks forward to and literally resounds within, thereby amplifying, the sound-image of the second term. The compound perception evoked by the repetition "reduces" multitude to unity and, insofar as it unfolds in syntactic sequence, succession to simultaneity. (p. 604) The aesthetic pleasure attending such reduction (not the right word: "co-amplification" would be better) is *emergent*, that is, it would not be produced by either of the inputs, "murmurs" or "nurse's," perceived in isolation. In just this way, perception and recollection, time present and time past, though different and distant (even if only by the "space" of syllables), "become blendings."⁵¹

This capacity and quality of Wordsworthian blending may serve to refine the *conceptual* but not yet fully *cognitive*⁵² analysis of time available in the blending theory of today. Fauconnier and Turner and their followers have abundantly demonstrated that "time as space is a deep metaphor for all human beings," "common across cultures, psychologically real, productive, and profoundly entrenched in thought and language."⁵³ But while blending theory *models* this psychological reality, it hardly conveys a *sense* of

it. For, as Coleridge well understood, the ongoing experience of consciousness may differ fundamentally from its conceptualization: “The act of consciousness is indeed identical with time considered in its essence. (I mean *per se*, as contradistinguished from our notion of time; for this is always blended with the idea of space, which as the contrary of time, is therefore its measure).”⁵⁴

Here we return to my opening distinction of temporal conceptualization and temporal experience, of time “going by” or “gotten through” as opposed to *time present*. Conventional time-as-space metaphors signify but do not re-present the lived experience of time, in which the past flows invariably forward, “back-to-front,” to inform the prospect of the present. This lived experience of time is essentially lacking in blending theory’s analysis of time conceptualizations, even though it is the *cognitive* ground from which they spring. Fauconnier and Turner analyze the genus of time concepts into two species, distinguished according to the (conceptual) stasis or motion of the conceptualizer: “Metaphor theory recognizes that motion of the ego through time as space has a dual [i.e., counterpart], namely, time as objects moving along a path past a stationary observer.”⁵⁵ Though they don’t mention it, the motion conceptualization involving “a stationary observer” further subdivides according to the *direction* in which “time as objects moving along a path” is conceived to flow. As their wording implies, Fauconnier and Turner focus on the flow of time “past” the stationary observer, from before to behind (e.g., “The lecture went by effortlessly”). But time can equally be conceived flowing in the reverse direction, from behind to before, or from past toward present and future (cf. “I was flooded with memories” or “My past caught up with me” or indeed “The child is father of the man”). More importantly, regardless of how it is *conceived*, time in the structure of cognitive *experience* is *always* forward flowing (even when that experience includes a conceptualization involving one or both of Fauconnier and Turner’s “duals”).

Fauconnier and Turner approach but do not capture the experiential structure of time in their analysis of expressions that measure the distance of the past relative to the present, as for example, “Our wedding was just yesterday” or the distinctly Wordsworthian “The days of my youth are so close and yet so far away.”⁵⁶ Fauconnier and Turner analyze the first of these expressions as follows: “the subjective feeling in R/S [the “recall-space” of memory] that the wedding is very accessible, very close, is mapped onto the (p. 605) subjective feeling about the events of yesterday,” that is, onto the abstract idea that what happened yesterday is “closer” in time than what happened years ago. “So,” conclude Fauconnier and Turner, “the blend endows R/S with a metric using the notion of time. Accordingly, in the . . . blend, the word ‘yesterday’ provides an adequate indication of distance in memory.”⁵⁷ Conspicuously missing from this account is the “space” of the present, verbally cued in the example by the deictic “yesterday” and indispensable to the

relative measure of proximity (the memory is “close to” or “far from” what?—the here and now of the speaker).⁵⁸ Consequently, the actual cognitive experience underlying the expression, which the expression but feebly symbolizes, remains out of view. In cognitive experience, recollection is always the re-presenting of the past, and its real bearing is always upon the present state of mind. Fauconnier and Turner speak of the resolution of “clashes” between “objective” or clock-time and subjective or experienced time in terms of the projection of a governing topology from *either one or the other* of two input spaces, as in “The days of my youth are so close and yet so far away,” which vacillates between the two.⁵⁹ But while an either-or choice of topologies may constrain the *conceptualization* underlying these everyday expressions, it does not constrain the passionate psychological reality such utterances strive to express. As we’ve seen, Wordsworth contrives through spatial form to hold *two* governing topologies *simultaneously* in mind, a time-respecting one that preserves the sense of the past’s temporal distance and a space-contriving one that collapses intervening intervals or “vacancies,” yielding the phenomenal sensation of spatial coexistence in the present.

What contemporary blending theory desperately needs—experimental paradigms that put its hypotheses to the test⁶⁰—Wordsworth’s blending theory and practice may well supply. Blending is a cognitive *process*, whereas expressions are conceptual *products*, that is, artifacts of the process that, in most discourse situations, neither preserve nor prime it. For the purposes of cognitive-scientific experiment, what’s required are discourse prompts that predictably—not only dependably, but also in specifiable and therefore falsifiable ways—generate the process(es) of blending, so that it/they can be introspectively analyzed and physically measured, to the further improvement of the theory.

Given the evidence of literary-critical history, barely skimmed here, we know empirically that Wordsworth’s spatial poetics represents the psychological experience of blending by reproducing it in the reader. How otherwise can we explain the continuous witness to this effect, using the very metaphor of “blending,” starting with Wordsworth and Coleridge themselves and echoed and amplified by Hartman, Armstrong, and countless other Wordsworthians? Guided by these poets and critics, we can identify the passages that most potently prime blending effects—the spots of time being obvious first candidates—and formulate hypotheses about which specific structural features in the selected passages are contributing to which specific effects. Especially when coordinated with a more general theory of spatial poetics—incorporating the insights of Coleridge, Frank, Jakobson, and others—predictions may then be converted into psychophysical experiments that control and systematically manipulate the variables of verbal structure at play in Wordsworth’s verse.

(p. 606)

Conclusion

This chapter has offered a cognitive update on mid-twentieth-century theories of spatial form and poetic function. These theories hold that verbal patterning of various kinds counterbalances, complicates, and otherwise resists the inescapable temporality of the linguistic medium, which necessarily delivers its message over time. To the extent that such verbal patterns are “re-cognized,” the sequential text unfolds in the reader’s experience not as a simple succession or *chronology* of meanings but as a complex conceptual *topography*, composed of “re-presented” images and ideas and colored by their affective correlates. This ideational-affective topography is structured as a palimpsest, both literally and thematically. A parchment on which earlier writing remains legible behind more recent writing, *palimpsest* has come to mean by metaphoric extension any object, place, or area that reflects or imaginatively incorporates its own history.⁶¹ In either sense, the palimpsest’s *legibility*, whether actual, reflective, or imaginative, is key. Cognition is throughout deeply and mysteriously palimpsestic, but it is *plainly* so in response to literature’s multiply layered spatial forms.

Wordsworth therefore defines poetry as “the history and science of feeling.”⁶² In his own case, the coordinate terms of this general claim should be more tightly related: Wordsworth’s poems, *The Prelude* chief among them, articulate *a science of the history of feeling*. Wordsworth means “science” not in a technical sense but in the earlier, more general sense of “knowledge or cognizance” of a particular subject.⁶³ At its best, poetry gives us, not a rational explanation of felt experience, but an impassioned analogy of it, an acknowledgment on the pulses that can lead, as literary criticism has so often demonstrated, to an enriched understanding of the mind. Poetry helps us to cognize the “history” or “historicity” of our own cognitive experience, conveying not just the feeling of feeling, but a feeling of feeling’s *temporal composition*.⁶⁴ Poetry that enables us to experience and reflectively understand the temporal composition of feeling may well be termed *a science of the history of feeling*. Wordsworth’s poetic science thus presents in little one of literature’s largest prospects upon futurity: its potentially critical role in the “new” cognitive neuroscience of mind, which seeks to understand as he did *The Feeling of What Happens*.⁶⁵

In advancing this specific argument about Wordsworth, I have pursued three more general objectives. First, I have outlined a cognitive approach to spatial poetics that would investigate how temporally distributed linguistic forms can prime more or less integrated “mental space” configurations (Coleridge’s phrase). Invoked by repeated sounds, words, images, figures, and so on, such mental configurations instantiate what

I've called back-to-front processing and render it susceptible to introspective analysis and experimental verification. Second, I have correlated the specific notion of spatial form with the more general theory of "literariness" or "the poetic function." The correlation suggests that there may be good cognitive grounds for the generic discrimination of literary from other kinds of discourse, as well as of narrative and lyric subspecies within (p. 607) the literary kind.⁶⁶ Third, the chapter intimates the critical role that cognitive literary studies may play in the broader interdisciplinary endeavor of cognitive science. Because many questions and issues confronting today's mind science have a storied history in literature and literary criticism, that history deserves cognitive study not only on its own account, but likewise for the insights and instigations it may offer for ongoing research in conceptual blending and related domains of cognitive science.

Acknowledgment

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Notes:

(1) . In the right context, of course, the deviance of either phrase may be unmarked: "a bird in the bird" makes perfect sense when one is cooking turducken, the American Thanksgiving dish in which a chicken is stuffed into a duck which is stuffed into a turkey; "a bird in the of" would be sensible in a context where a bird was sitting in a sculptural representation of the word "of." These examples indicate that pragmatic context forms an integral part of the predictive structure of cognition.

(2) . "In-out" and "out-in" have the horizontality of "back-front" and "front-back" but lack their temporal implications (derived from the fact the human movement is forward, "frontal," or, if you like, "prospective").

(3) . William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads: 1798 and 1800*, ed. Michael Gamer and Dahlia Porter (Toronto: Broadview, 2008), 175, 183.

(4) . William Wordsworth, *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth*, ed. Ernest de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), 5.344.

(5) . *American Heritage College Dictionary*, s.v. *reversion*, senses 1 and 2.

(6) . Wordsworth and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, 183.

(7) . Wordsworth and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, 420.

- (8) . See Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, *A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Daniel L. Schacter and Donna Rose Addis, "The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory: Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future," in *Mental Processes in the Human Brain*, ed. Jon Driver, Patrick Haggard, and Tim Shallice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27-47; and Alan Richardson, "Defaulting to Fiction: Neuroscience Rediscovered the Romantic Imagination," *Poetics Today* 32.4 (2011): 663-92.
- (9) . See the related discussion in Nancy Easterlin, *A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory and Interpretation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 66ff. and 193ff.
- (10) . William Wordsworth, *The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850*, ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 1979), 1805 2.28-33. Wordsworth's phenomenological point is garnering renewed attention in contemporary cognitive neuroscience: "In memory an object appears in the present but as belonging to the past. It is thus an aspect of inner consciousness that mixes past and present without collapsing their temporal distance. Thus it is as if consciousness doubles itself" (Francisco Varela and Natalie Depraz, "Imagining: Embodiment, Phenomenology, and Transformation," in *Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground*, ed. B. Alan Wallace [New York: Columbia University Press, 2003], 211).
- (11) . Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, vol. 1, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 1823 16.206.
- (12) . Coleridge, *Notebooks*, 1823 16.206n.
- (13) . Coleridge, *Notebooks*, 1771 16.157.
- (14) . Joseph Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature: Part I," *Sewanee Review* 53 (1945): 221-40.
- (15) . Joseph Frank, "Spatial Form: Thirty Years After," in *Spatial Form in Narrative*, ed. Jeffrey R. Smitten and Ann Daghistany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 204.
- (16) . Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," 239.
- (17) . Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," 227, emphasis added.
- (18) . Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," 229-30.
- (19) . Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," 232.

- (20) . Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2 vols., ed. John Shawcross (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 1.52.
- (21) . In Jakobson's words, the extent to which "the principle of equivalence is projected from the axis of selection to the axis of combination," as in the political slogan "I Like Ike" ("Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics," in *Style in Language*, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 350-77.
- (22) . Frank, "Spatial Form: Thirty Years After," 229ff.
- (23) . Robert Langbaum, "The Epiphanic Mode in Wordsworth and Modern Literature," *New Literary History* 14 (1983): 336, 346.
- (24) . Monique R. Morgan, *Narrative Means, Lyric Ends: Temporality in the Nineteenth-Century British Long Poem* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2009), 19. Easterlin presents a very similar argument in explicitly cognitive terms: "By divorcing causality from chronology. . . , Wordsworth reveals the epistemic limitations of basic narrative, which in habitually aligning causality and temporality in observable sequence leads away from the achronological, invisible processes of self- and fellow-knowledge" (*Biocultural Approach*, 74).
- (25) . Coleridge, *Notebooks*, 1823 16.206n.
- (26) . Coleridge, *Notebooks*, 1823 16.206n.
- (27) . Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2.16.
- (28) . Also a metrical parallelism created by spondaic substitutions: as a "bright star shooteth" "so glides he."
- (29) . Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1.52.
- (30) . See Coleridge, *Notebooks*, 1620.
- (31) . Wordsworth and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, 288.
- (32) . Wordsworth and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, 288.
- (33) . Wordsworth and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, 288.
- (34) . Geoffrey H. Hartman, *Wordsworth's Poetry 1787-1814* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 150.
- (35) . Hartman, *Wordsworth's Poetry 1787-1814*, 178, 207.

(36) . Hartman, *Wordsworth's Poetry 1787-1814*, 69, 270.

(37) . Hartman, *Wordsworth's Poetry 1787-1814*, 207. See Colin Clarke's very similar argument (advanced two years prior to Hartman's) about the "effect of double exposure" that is "prepared for by everything that has gone before" (Colin C. Clarke, *Romantic Paradox: An Essay on the Poetry of Wordsworth* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962], 50). Anticipating my study as well, Clarke emphasizes Wordsworth's "habit of referring to mental events in spatial terms" and his ability to create "a strange blend of past and present" (16, 65).

(38) . Isobel Armstrong, "Wordsworth's Complexity: Repetition and Doubled Syntax in *The Prelude* Book VI," *Oxford Literary Review* 4 (1981): 22.

(39) . Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, 1805 11.302-27.

(40) . Armstrong, "Wordsworth's Complexity," 32.

(41) . Armstrong, "Wordsworth's Complexity," 32-33.

(42) . Armstrong, "Wordsworth's Complexity," 34.

(43) . See the related analyses of multisensory imagery in G. Gabrielle Starr, "Multi-sensory Imagery," in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 275-91.

(44) . Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

(45) . See, e.g., the 1999 special issue of *Poetics Today* on metaphor, the 2006 special issue of *Language and Literature* on literary applications of blending theory, and Barbara Dancygier, *The Language of Stories: A Cognitive Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). But see also Easterlin, *Biocultural Approach*, 171ff, for a general critique of blending theory.

(46) . For discussion, see Monica Gonzales-Marquez, Irene Mittelberg, Seana Coulson, and Michael J. Spivey, eds., *Methods in Cognitive Linguistics* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007).

(47) . Gilles Fauconnier, *Espaces mentaux: Aspects de la construction du sens dans les langues naturelles* (Paris: Les Editions des Minuit, 1984).

(48) . Christopher Wordsworth, *Memoirs of William Wordsworth*, 2 vols. (London: Edward Moxon, 1851), 477; emphasis added.

(49) . Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, 1799 1.1–3.

(50) . So far as I know, Francis Steen was the first to read these opening lines in terms of blending theory (“‘The Time of Unrememberable Being’: Wordsworth’s Autobiography of the Imagination,” *A/B: Autobiography Studies* 13 [1998]: 7–38).

(51) . Hartman, *Wordsworth’s Poetry 1787–1814*, 167.

(52) . It should be clear by this point that I mean “cognitive” in the broadest sense, as involving and integrating sensation, emotion, memory, attention, conceptualization, etc.

(53) . Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, “Rethinking Metaphor,” in *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54.

(54) . Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1.87; see also Vyvyan Evans, *The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning, and Temporal Cognition* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2003).

(55) . Fauconnier and Turner, “Rethinking Metaphor,” 60; see also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 137–69.

(56) . Fauconnier and Turner, “Rethinking Metaphor,” 62.

(57) . Fauconnier and Turner, “Rethinking Metaphor,” 62.

(58) . See Mark J. Bruhn, “Place Deixis and the Schematics of Imagined Space: Milton to Keats,” *Poetics Today* 26 (2005): 387–432.

(59) . They figure this resolution process in terms of bistable imagery: “Subjective experience can vary quickly for a single experiencer, vary depending on the focus, and even toggle back and forth like a Necker cube, as in the following attested piece of data: ‘Time goes by really slowly. At the same time, it goes by really fast.’ (CNN, said by a man waiting for word on an American named ‘Michael’ missing in the bomb detonations in London in July 2005)” (Fauconnier and Turner, “Rethinking Metaphor,” 61). But the truth is that there’s no going back: colored by the preceding one(s), a next impression of the “same” thing necessarily differs from the first. Moreover, while Fauconnier and Turner treat the attested data (which is still not speaking of the *fusion* of forward-going subjective experiences) as something of an exception to more routine ways of cognizing time, the *redoubled subjectivity* it implies is, at the experiential level, the regular state of affairs. Cf. the West African proverb: “L’eau chaude n’oublie jamais qu’elle a été froide.”

(60) . See Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., "Making Good Psychology Out of Blending Theory," *Cognitive Linguistics* 11 (2000): 347-58.

(61) . *American Heritage College Dictionary*, s.v. *palimpsest*.

(62) . Wordsworth and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, 288.

(63) . *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. *science*, n. 1a.

(64) . A phrase that means to imitate what it describes: the foregoing adjective "temporal" modifies the subsequent and spatial substantive "composition."

(65) . To put it in terms of Antonio Damasio's representative title (*The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999]). For further discussion of why and how romanticism in particular may factor in cognitive science, see Mark J. Bruhn, "Romanticism and the Cognitive Science of Imagination," *Studies in Romanticism* 48 (2009): 543-64; "Harmonious Madness: The Poetics of Analogy at the Limits of Blending Theory," *Poetics Today* 32.4 (2011): 619-62; "Mind Out of Time: Wordsworth and Neurophenomenology," *European Romantic Review* 24 (2013): 421-36; David Duff, *Romanticism and the Uses of Genre* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); "Melodies of Mind: Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures," *Cognition, Literature, and History*, ed. Mark J. Bruhn and Donald R. Wehrs (New York: Routledge, 2014), 17-38; Alan Richardson, *The Neural Sublime: Romantic Texts and Cognitive Theories* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Richardson, "Defaulting to Fiction"; and Steen, "Time of Unremembered Being."

(66) . See Vladimir E. Alexandrov, "Literature, Literariness, and the Brain," *Comparative Literature* 59 (2007): 97-118; Reuven Tsur, "Deixis and Abstractions: Adventures in Space and Time," *Cognitive Poetics in Practice*, ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen (London: Routledge, 2003), 41-54.

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